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theory is how much can be derived from propositions that are so
simple. For example, once one accepts that, as a general matter,
demand decreases as price increases, much else follows. Graduate
students sometimes reduce all of microeconomics to only four
words-people maximize, markets clear.
Richard Posner's achievement was to use these same axioms
to illuminate the forces at work in the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem. He laid bare the architecture of the common law by showing
how much of it could be derived from the axioms of economics.
The claim was never that only these mattered, but rather that
even by themselves they showed that the law had a logic and co-
herence that before we had only known intuitively. After Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, no one wrote about the common law the
same way again."
Law and Economics is now well into its seventh decade. It
has always renewed itself, has always remained at the cutting
edge, and has always kept first principles squarely in mind. Its
practitioners remain committed to physics rather than stamp
collecting. It is in that spirit that Gary Becker, Ronald Coase,
Merton Miller, and Richard Posner reflect on the future of Law
and Economics, under the strong hand of Richard Epstein, him-
self a formidable practitioner of the discipline.'
The Roundtable Discussion
RICHARD EPSTEIN: On this kind of occasion, there always
is a temptation to turn back to history. Quite by coincidence, the
other day Stephen Stigler gave me a sheaf of papers which in-
cluded correspondence between Friedrich von Hayek and Henry
Simons. It contained a proposal for the creation of the Institute of
Political Economy at the University of Chicago. In describing this
program in a letter to Hayek, this is what our friend Henry
Simons wrote:
A distinctive feature of Chicago economics as represented re-
cently by Knight and Viner, is its traditional liberal political
philosophy, its emphasis on the virtues of the dispersion of
economic power, free markets, and a political decentraliza-
tion, real federalism for large nations and for supernational
n This landmark book, first published in 1973, is now in its fourth edition. See Richard
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992).
' Among many other works, his foundational book on property remains required read-
ing for everyone in* the law. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard 1985).
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organizations. With the scattering of the Austrians and the
vastly changed complexion of economics at Cambridge and
Harvard, this intellectual tradition of Smith, Ricardo, Mill,
Menger, Wieser, Sidgwick, Marshall, Pigou, Taussig, Locke,
Hume, Bentham, de Tocqueville, and Humboldt is now al-
most entirely unrepresented among the great universities
save for Chicago-and it may not long be well represented at
Chicago.
So we see a situation that has replicated itself constantly for
a period of over fifty years. Chicago has always thought itself to
be a highly distinctive institution with a rather highly distinctive
view. It often manages to think of this view as its collective view,
even though the individuals who embrace this view are often very
quick to disagree with one another. Today, in effect, is an occasion
for us to reflect, to comment and to evaluate what has happened
to the law, what has happened to economics, and what has hap-
pened to the synergy between Law and Economics over the past
fifty years. The one point we can make with complete confidence
is that Simons was wrong in his prophecy about the survival of
this tradition. "It may not long be well represented at Chicago"
cannot be true given the glorious history of Law and Economics at
this University. Surely, for example, we have an eminent panel
here. But our distinction goes deeper. Milton Friedman and
George Stigler would be worthy additions to this or to any other
panel if they were in this room today.
We are now going to talk about Law and Economics both in
terms of its past and in terms of its future. We have a stellar cast
to guide us in this particular discussion. The pattern that we are
going to follow is one of remarkable simplicity. The University of
Chicago is known for its great contribution to social ordering: the
principle of alphabetical order. Having staked our claim to that
principle, rm going to ask the panelists-who are seated in al-
phabetical order--each to spend eight to ten minutes-this is not
a strict boundary but a presumptive boundary-to outline their
thoughts about the past and the future of Law and Economics.
Then we will have some discussion within the panel about the
subject, and then we will open it up to questions from the floor.
I have received very precise marching orders from the Law
Review. I want to thank them-Ross Davies, Bo Rutledge, Chris
Bowers, Howard Nielson-and all the others on the staff who put
this thing together.
And I have received strict instructions to mention the fol-
lowing kinds of questions as focal points of the discussion:
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(1) What have been the most important achievements in the-
ory or practice of Law and Economics? What are its major disap-
pointments or failures?-Answer: none. (laughter).
(2) What is the most promising and important work still
waiting to be done in Law and Economics? How should this work
be done? This query has to do with the relative merits of mathe-
matical modeling versus empirical investigation, working from
the top down or the bottom up and meeting somewhere in the
middle. Finally, to what audience ought this stuff be directed?
So without further ado, we will start with Gary, then go down
the panel, and I've got lots more questions to ask once we have re-
ceived the authoritative answers to the ones that I've just posed.
GARY BECKER: Thank you. I'm happy to participate in a
symposium even though I'm certainly not an expert in Law and
Economics. A relatively small fraction of my time over the years
has been spent on this subject. That doesn't prevent me from
having strong opinions. (laughter). And, like my other panelists
here, I am going to express these opinions about what I think its
successes have been and its failures or its limitations, and I won't
make many predictions about the future, but I will talk about
where I think it has succeeded and where it has not succeeded.
There is no question in my mind that Law and Economics has
had enormous success in many different dimensions. I'll mention
a few in a moment.
The reasons for its successes are two. The first reason is that
it uses three principles-not two principles-but three principles.
The two principles that were already mentioned by Dean Baird
were (1) people maximize and (2) markets clear. And those are
clearly very important components of Law and Economics. So
whether it's companies, or whether it's individuals, we assume
that they are basically trying as best they can to increase their
benefits, reduce their costs-whether deciding to pollute, to tres-
pass, or to commit a crime-and that's a common theme through-
out all the analysis. And without these principles, I think most of
all economics would be lost and it's a very powerful, even though
a very simple, basis.
Next, economists focus on markets. Markets don't always
work perfectly by any means, but there are markets. Indeed,
there are markets even in activities where there are no prices, as
in crime. There is a criminal market. It is not absurd to talk about
a criminal market, or a marriage market, or a market for govern-
ment. And these concepts are important. Markets try to reconcile
the unbounded desires of individuals with the limited resources
available. That is really the main function of markets. And they
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operate in every aspect of the law as well as in other aspects of
the economy and of social and political life. And so Law and Eco-
nomics soundly builds on the importance of markets.
The third concept that Dean Baird did not mention, but pre-
sumed, is the importance of efficiency. Economists put a great
deal of emphasis on efficiency, not because private economies are
always efficient, or because governments are always inefficient,
but because if one moves to a more efficient outcome, it is possible
to make everyone better off. Everybody could be made better off
by having a more efficient organization of either a legal system, a
political system, or any market. And I think that potential to
make everybody better off drives a lot of the contributions in Law
and Economics-from Coase's theorem to Posner's emphasis on
court interpretation under the common law. And it drives much of
economics. Since it's only a potential improvement whenever an
economy moves to a more efficient outcome, the potential may not
be realized and some people may be made worse off. Efficiency is
therefore not the only criterion. But any intelligent discussion of
either legal systems, economies, or political behavior must give
enormous attention to the role of efficiency and to asking whether
a change in a new law, or a new political program, has made the
economy more or less efficient.
So, to come back to my main theme, one reason for the great
success of Law and Economics is that the principles of economics
are so fuzndamental, so simple really. I had a teacher, Frank
Knight, who used to say that economics is so simple he was sur-
prised why not everybody is a great economist. They are simple.
The trick is to apply them in interesting ways, of course. And that
isn't always so simple. But the basic principles are simple, learn-
able and, as I'll come back to, they are being learned not only by
economists but by many lawyers and others.
The second reason why I think Law and Economics has been
so successful-and this might be more controversial-is that there
was nothing before it came that had comparable scope and im-
pact. When you bring a theory to bear on a body of doctrine and
when, prior to that theory, there was no systematic analysis
available, it is easy for the theory to win even though it has many
limitations. And Ill come to some of the limitations. So I think
that one of the reasons explaining the great success of the eco-
nomic analysis of the law and other applications of economics-
whether in sociology, demography, and so on-is that economics
provided a general systematic way of looking at phenomena in ar-
eas where there hadn't been any prior theory or analysis of com-
parable scope. In my judgment, that is an important factor in ex-
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plaining the success of Law and Economics, even though it has
many limitations, as I think everybody would recognize.
The success is found in many parts of the law, many of which
I'm certainly no expert, such as environmental law or securities
law. Criminal law, the area that I had worked some on, has been
a controversial field, but the work of the last ten or fifteen years
has done as much as anything to give greater attention to the role
of economic thinking in the criminal area. So I would include
criminal law as one of the successful areas of Law and Economics.
However, there are parts of the law where it has been less
successful. One of the areas I've worked on a lot-not so much on
legal problems but on other aspects-is the family. I think Law
and Economics potentially can be a major contributor to the fam-
ily, and there have been some significant contributions. On the
other hand, I think one would have to say this field has not been
one of the areas of its greatest success. Family law is not one of
the strongest parts of the law in general, and therefore less atten-
tion has been paid to applications of economics to legal aspects of
the family. But it's a great field and holds great promise, and it
will lead Law and Economics down somewhat different directions
than it has taken in other areas.
Another area where the field has not succeeded-and maybe
I am asking too much of it-is in trying to get a better assessment
of which laws in fact do get passed. Not simply which laws should
get passed but which laws do get passed. In order to have a robust
analysis of Law and Economics, it's not sufficient to understand
the impact of particular laws or even to understand how courts
make decisions in interpreting particular laws. There is an inti-
mate interaction between the laws and regulations that get
passed and the interpretation that we find in the courts. And I
think Law and Economics, along with other parts of economics,
has not yet been very successful in giving us a powerful under-
standing of the trade-off between different types of laws and
regulations and interpretations that we see actually out there in
the real world. This is a limitation of all of economics and it's a
limitation of political science as well. In my judgment, it is just
one of the areas about which we don't know enough. But it has to
be said that a field that is dealing with laws suffers a very serious
limitation when it is unable to give an important and powerful in-
terpretation and understanding of which laws do get passed.
Finally, I feel Law and Economics is currently in a less dy-
namic and more static phase-a "mopping up" phase, so to speak,
as opposed to an exciting phase. The first bloom is off, as the ideas
of Coase and Posner and Landes and Merton Miller and many
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others have been absorbed and helped organize the field. And that
is true for all theories, since theories evolve in cycles. There is an
initial excitement: a new theory comes along, people are excited.
It seems to open up new phenomena; it helps us interpret a lot of
phenomena. That certainly has been true in Law and Economics.
But then, of course, these ideas get absorbed, people learn, and
they ask, "What have you done for me lately?" And lately, there
has been less excitement, less novelty. There's further application
which is useful and more absorption of basic ideas takes place.
That is to be expected.
There is one aspect of Law and Economics, however, that
troubles me. I think Law and Economics has been too theoretical
a discipline. And I'll put my work in that category as well. That
doesn't mean there has been no contact with the real world. There
has been enormous interaction with the real world, mainly inter-
pretation of some institutions and of case law, but there has been
relatively little quantitative analysis in the field of Law and Eco-
nomics, particularly because theoretical problems attracted most
of the economists that have gone into this field, and most lawyers
do not have much training in quantitative analysis. Overall, Law
and Economics, with a few major exceptions such as Dick Posner
and Bill Landes, and Ronald Coase in looking at institutions, has
been a theoretical discipline. The problem with having a disci-
pline that is too theoretical is that you begin to discuss the prob-
lems raised by other theorists rather than the problems raised by
trying to understand the world out there. To some extent that is
happening in Law and Economics. If that is not corrected, there is
a greater likelihood the field will become sterile and will not grow
like other fields that have a closer interaction between data and
various forms and theory.
So let me summarize what I have said. I think Law and Eco-
nomics has been enormously successful-it's one of the great suc-
cess stories in social sciences. If one looks at the applications of
economics outside of traditional areas, Law and Economics would
rank up with the first or second most significant application in my
judgment. But it has not been fully successful because it replaced
a field of analysis that was weak and unsystematic. And therefore
the fact that it has significant limitations so far-maybe they will
be eventually eliminated-was less clear since it's been relatively
easily to replace what had gone on before.
And finally I think that despite its enormous success, Law
and Economics has entered into a more static, a more sterile pe-
riod. The risk is that the detachment of the theory from the real
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world may make the period of sterility more extended than in
other areas where theories have gone through this cycle.
So I have great confidence in what has been accomplished, I
have great hopes about the future, but I also have some worries
about the future.
Thank you.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: All right, Ronald, do you want to take
over?
RONALD COASE: I never wanted to take over anything.
When I first received this invitation to take part in this
roundtable, I was very reluctant to accept, and when I saw the set
of questions that we had to answer, I was appalled. The only
bright feature that I felt existed was that I had all these other
people on the roundtable so that they could do most of the talking.
Here I was encouraged to note that Professor Epstein was also
present. (laughter).
Now the reason why I found some difficulty and little pleas-
ure in accepting is that I know next to nothing about law. I am an
economist. My only acquaintance with the law was when I was an
undergraduate taking a degree in commerce, I took some law
courses in 1929 and 1930. Well, my memory of them isn't too
good, although my memory nowadays of what happened last week
isn't too good either. (laughter).
I'll give my views, such as they are, on the subject of Law and
Economics.
As I see it, the subject is divided into two parts which are
separating more and more as time goes by. One is-and here
Judge Posner is the person who has made the greatest contribu-
tion-the use of economics to analyze the law, the economic
analysis of law. And this part embraces the use of economic ap-
proaches and economic concepts, first, to discuss the doctrines
with which lawyers work and, second, to discuss the working of
the legal system.
Now, an economist really isn't much interested in this part of
Law and Economics-at least this economist isn't. I am interested
in the working of the economic system and that doesn't mean that
I'm not interested in the legal system. rm interested in the effect
that the working of the legal system has on the working of the
economic system. What difference does it make if you have a dif-
ferent legal system? What difference does it make if the laws are
changed? What difference does it make if you have regulation of
this type or some other type? That's why I'm interested in Law
and Economics. And it is why when I came to the University of
Chicago, I only really came because it also gave me an opportu-
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nity to edit the Journal of Law and Economics, which I thought
would be important in forwarding this process.
If we look at the two parts of Law and Economics and focus
on the Posner side, we see a vast literature of high quality and it
seems to me that the literature reflects what Gary has said: it is a
subject which is now well developed and therefore in some sense
less exciting. I am sure that there is a lot more to be done, but a
lot is being done. It's fine work and so on. So this is a look from
the outside. I am very impressed.
Now let's talk about the parts of Law and Economics that in-
terest me.
Well, what difference does it make if different countries use
different legal systems at different times and so on or the same
country uses different legal systems?
Let me give my viewpoint. I adopt the view which comes from
Adam Smith that the productivity-the efficiency, if you like-of
an economic system depends on, as Adam Smith puts it, the divi-
sion of labor, or as I would say, on the specialization of people, of
firms, of countries. But you can't have specialization without ex-
change and, therefore, the ability to make exchanges is a very
necessary part of a good economic system. The greater the ease of
making exchanges, the more possibilities there are, the more pro-
ductive and the more efficient the economic system will be.
Now, I have always argued that the market unfortunately
isn't free, just as lunches aren't free, and that there are costs of
transacting. To make exchanges possible-and therefore the spe-
cialization which is the root of greater productivity possible-you
have to have relatively low transaction costs. And the aspect of
the legal system that therefore interests me is its effect on trans-
action costs. Does it make exchanges easier or more difficult?
Well, we know that in fact it does both. If you have to get two
hundred licenses in order to import goods or make anything, it is
quite clear that the transaction costs are extremely high and in-
deed there may be no production at all. On the other hand, you
can make laws that make transactions easier, like defining the
rights of people and so on.
Well, that's the part of Law and Economics that interests me,
and I must say it doesn't seem to me at all static at the present
time. There is a lot of work to be done, but a lot of work is being
done. It's very exciting at the present time. Of course, there are
other institutions which can operate too. I've always mentioned
firms which are an alternative to the market and their existence
and their performance depends on the state of the law as well.
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Now-and again this refers back to the point that Gary
made-the studies of the contracting process are going forward all
over the world. I am impressed by the work that is being done.
The influence of Chicago is not confined to other American uni-
versities but is influencing work going on in China or in Russia or
even in France or countries like that. (laughter). You notice the
influence, and I'm very impressed. My feeling is that in about
two--say one-hundred years time we will really understand this
whole business. In the meantime, a lot of work is being done. Next
month, I happen to be going to a conference which is dealing with
joint venture contracts in China. And a lot of contracts, hundreds
of contracts, are being studied by the Chinese, actually in Hong
Kong as you would expect, but there are also American firms in-
terested as work on contracting is going on in business schools.
One of the interesting features to my mind is that this work
is going on everywhere and is ultimately going to be very fruit-
ful-not static at all and dealing with the real world-but it is
going on in some law schools, a lot in business schools in different
places, and even some in engineering schools. Oddly enough, very
little in economics departments. But in a way it is what you would
expect: if economics departments, as Gary has indicated, aren't
doing the work, other places will. There's competition, as you
know, in the world and that affects things. In Stockholm, I ex-
pressed a somewhat similar view and, after a lecture of mine,
audience members asked me what was the future of economics
departments if I had this pessimistic view. And I said, well, they
will be like departments of theology. They continue to exist but
the interesting work takes place elsewhere. (laughter). And one of
the places that it takes place is in law schools. (laughter and ap-
plause).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: We now turn to one of the least theis-
tic people or theological people I've ever met-I will not say the
former, only the latter-Merton Miller, who will speak about his
views of the subject. He has also taught at the Law School, mainly
in the area of financial regulation.
MERTON MILLER: Thank you. It's a great pleasure to be
here and see so many former students in attendance. Let me say
that like Gary and Ron, I felt something of an outsider at first. I'm
an economist-not a Law and Economics specialist-until I sud-
denly stopped to think. Like the character in Molihre, Monsieur
Jourdan, who was surprised he was speaking prose all his life, I
suddenly realized I've been doing Law and Economics, in that
subfield of economics known as finance, for the last thirty years. I
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am a practitioner of Law and Economics not a philosopher or his-
torian of Law and Economics.
I am involved with Law and Economics in two ways actually.
The first is what might be called forensic Law and Economics,
where I serve as an expert economics witness in a lawsuit. It is
exciting work, it's lucrative work, but I try to keep it down to a
minimum of those cases that pose particularly important general
principles. Let me give you an example by offering a "hypotheti-
cal," as the lawyer taking my deposition called it. (Incidentally, as
long as I'm here, I'd like to advise the law school students that
there's a difference between a hypothetical and a counterfactual.
They are two quite different concepts and I'll answer any hypo-
thetical, but counterfactuals pose some severe difficulties.)
As for the hypothetical then, suppose the government says
that a bank has violated its capital requirements-it doesn't have
enough capital-and suppose the government closes the bank
down for failure to meet those requirements. The bank claims in-
jury from the government action, and it sues for lost profits.
What happens then? Mountains of data and spread sheets
are assembled, accountants are hired and estimates are made of
the profits that the bank would have earned had it been allowed
to continue. And, incidentally, once you are playing this game in
which you've got nothing to lose by asking for too much, these
numbers mount up and get huge. In one case the plaintiffs esti-
mates of its lost profits went up into the billions even though the
firm had never earned more than $50 million.
To someone in finance, of course, there is no sense in the idea
of lost profits. It's almost an oxymoron, because we in finance
start from the position that a firm can always raise additional eq-
uity capital to put itself back into capital compliance. It may not
want to raise it, but it always can raise the funds. It should want
to raise the money if the expected rate of return on the new capi-
tal that it is putting in is greater than the weighted average cost
of the capital.
Suppose that is the case and that the bank floats and restores
its capital. It will then earn precisely the same profits it would
have earned if it had not been ruled out of capital compliance. No
profits lost here! There is a cost to this transaction, of course,
namely the flotation cost, a transaction cost that Ron always
rightly stresses. But aside from the transaction costs, no damage
has been suffered.
Now suppose we go in the other direction: the bank doesn't
float because it estimates that the expected rate of return on
funds raised by the flotation is less than the cost of the capital.
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Then the bank won't float, which tells us it really had no good
earnings prospects. And if they had no good earnings prospects,
then again there were no profits to lose. In either case, therefore,
economic analysis of the problem says that because you can al-
ways float capital, if it's profitable to do so, then there can't be any
lost profits. I see from the squirming in the audience that I'm go-
ing to get some problems here. (laughter). I hope you're not
working for the other side.
Expert witness work is one phase of Law and Economics for
me. But there is another important side of Law and Economics
that takes up most of my time. That's the study of the costs and
benefits of current and prospective financial regulation, my sub-
specialty for the last several years. I can't speak on the economics
of crime, except as it applies to the securities industry. (laughter).
Securities crime looms so large because our Securities and Ex-
change Commission was set up initially on the utterly false
premise that the crash of 1929 and all the subsequent ills of the
economy and the banking industry can be traced to some kind of
criminal conspiracy in Wall Street during the 1920s. That false
premise pervades not only the whole structure of the financial
regulatory system, but even pervades the personality of the
Commission itself, which is one of the most lawyer-dominated,
lawyer-run agencies in the whole government. And I don't mean
that as a compliment (laughter), because the Commission is sup-
posedly dealing with matters of economics and it is run basically
by people who are criminal lawyers.
Criminal lawyers are fine when they are dealing with well-
defined criminal cases-I think they're fine; I don't know; I'll
stipulate that for their benefit here. But criminal lawyers don't
understand the impersonal market forces that are at work in the
capital markets and they bog down in all sorts of surface cich6s
about "fairness" and "level playing fields" and "equal access to in-
formation." I was once teasing someone at the Commission by
saying, "Look, if you were right and you finally got to the point
where everybody had equal access to the same information, no-
body would trade. In fact, if you force everybody to have the same
information before trading, you destroy the incentives to acquire
the information in the first place."
In terms of promulgating its regulations, the Commission
never offers a cost-benefit analysis. As George Stigler pointed out
a long time ago," the Commission has never even asked whether
there are any benefits at all, let alone whether the benefits of its
' George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J Bus 117 (1964).
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regulations are worth the obvious costs. Instead, they talk in cli-
ch6s like the "stunning sunlight of disclosure." (laughter). Well,
that's fine if you can show that disclosure has some benefit or that
there are no private incentives to disclose and that there are no
costs for all of these disclosure requirements that you are impos-
ing on the public.
Cost-benefit analyses represent the normative side of the
field and I like to think that I am active in it. There is also a posi-
tive or descriptive side to my brand of Law and Economics. Gary
mentioned that we don't have very good theories of what laws we
get, but we can make some pretty good guesses as to what regula-
tions we will get. A powerful searchlight for finding one's way
through the regulatory universe is found in the great '71 paper of
George Stigler: look for the cui bono, Stigler insists, not the pro
bono. In sum, we've got a good theory of why we see the regulation
that we do, but we don't have any theory of why we see the de-
regulation we do. That is a more difficult problem on which fur-
ther work is urgently needed.
With that as a background, let me turn to Richard's two ques-
tions: What are the achievements of Law and Economics? I think
they are amazing. Just getting the recognition in the law of this
country that there exist many issues that look legal but are really
economic, or that can be broken down or illuminated with eco-
nomic analysis was a huge accomplishment. Other countries are
behind us in this respect by twenty-five years at least, maybe
more. This has really been a major accomplishment in the parts of
the law with which I am familiar. We've come so far that even the
Commission, slowly being dragged kicking and screaming every
step of the way, is beginning to recognize the power of economic
analysis.
The failure of Law and Economics, as I see it, is that it hasn't
gone far enough: Judges are still wrestling with ancient legal
chestnuts that are better handled from a Law and Economics per-
spective. But I don't despair. I suspect, Gary, that what's keeping
Law and Economics from taking over even stronger is just genera-
tional. That's the way things work. It's hard to get some of these
notions into the minds of some lawyers and judges that were
trained in the old way. The concepts are just too foreign and I de-
spair that some will never be educated. There is only one way to
deal with them and that's to let them retire and die off. (laughter).
That's by no means peculiar to this field. Of course, my college
classmate, recently deceased, Thomas Kuhn, wrote a book enti-
tled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He wrote about the
Copernican revolution and I'm sure we all think, "Well, Coperni-
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cus published his book and everybody said, 'that's it: the sun is
the center and the planets go around it." No. People stuck with
the old system for many years. The old system gave just as accu-
rate readings for the planetary motions and it avoided certain se-
rious paradoxes with which astronomers did not want to grapple.
So how did the Copernican system take over? It took over gradu-
ally as the older generation who were trained in the previous sys-
tem eventually were replaced with younger professors who were
trained in the newer system.
So, with that bit of encouragement, I would urge the young
law students here to keep plugging away at Law and Economics-
someday you will take over the world. (applause).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: With our concession to the youth
movement, we now turn to Judge Posner.
JUDGE POSNER: Thank you. But given the age of the
panel, I'm not sure we're in a great position to discuss the future
of Law and Economics. (laughter). But I'll try. The impact of Law
and Economics has been various. One point that ought to be par-
ticularly stressed in the Law School is that a number of important
areas of practical law have been altered by economic analysis.
Admittedly, it is difficult to tell whether the real impact is the im-
pact of economic ideas or, as may well be the more important case,
economics gave respectability to the instincts of people who fa-
vored efficient policies for different reasons. Business-oriented
people and conservative lawyers were troubled by the antitrust
jurisprudence of the 1950s, but they didn't have the vocabulary or
conceptual system with which to criticize that jurisprudence.
When the ideas were produced in academia for consumption in
the practical world, these conservative judges and business-
oriented people found their voice and found there was a respect-
able body of academic thinking that they could use to support
their predilections. But even if the main thing that economics
does is give a patina of academic respectability to people's in-
stincts or a vocabulary in which people can express their prefer-
ences, that contribution can have a big impact on policy.
If you look across the whole legal system, you see a lot of ar-
eas where the impact of economic thinking is visible, but most of
the work has been done within the last twenty-five years. The an-
titrust field is an obvious example. Antitrust thinking is now per-
vaded by economic analysis. The deregulation movement certainly
got a lot of its intellectual fire power from economic analysis, and
the regulation that remains also shows the stamp of economic
thinking. There are remarkable developments, for example, in the
environmental field with the emergence of tradeable sulfur-
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dioxide emission permits and other efforts by regulatory agencies
to bring the market into the regulatory process.
There have been parallel developments in other areas of
regulation. We have all read about the FCC auctions that have
now collected some twenty-odd billion dollars by auctioning off
frequencies; even regulators now use the market to try to allocate
or prevent congestion of the airwaves.
In Professor Miller's field, where tens of billions of dollars are
affected, we have seen the emergence of the passive index funds,
where, instead of trying to pick winners or pick market turns, the
managers try to maximize diversification. Twenty years ago it
would have been thought a breach of trust for any money man-
ager with fiduciary obligations, such as a pension fund manager,
to invest passively and worry more about diversification than
about picking individual stocks and making sure you weren't
holding the stock of a bankrupt company. Now it is thoroughly ac-
cepted that diversification with passive investing is proper fiduci-
ary behavior, and many billions of dollars have been affected by
this economic concept.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for white collar crime
show the stamp of economic reasoning. There was an economist
on the Sentencing Commission, and John Lott, now at the Law
School, was an influential member of the Commission's staff. The
bankruptcy laws are being overhauled, and I think the revisions
will show a significant stamp of economic thought. All sorts of re-
medial questions in law, such as the computation of damages in
personal injury and commercial cases, now reflect the stamp of
economic reasoning.
Human capital has become a concept in the law of employ-
ment discrimination. Employers confronted with wage differen-
tials between men and women and young and old will often ap-
peal to human capital concepts to try to give a noninvidious ex-
planation for these differences. Although Gary suggested that
family law is a laggard in the economic analysis of law, just in the
last year or so feminist legal scholars have discovered that there
are lots of resources in the economics of the family for making the
kind of arguments that they want to make. For example, they
want to say that a wife shouldn't depend on the love of her hus-
band to make sure that she gets her fair share of the household
output. There ought to be efforts to monetize the economic value
of housework so as to create a more secure basis for spousal
claims. The idea that the professional degree of one's spouse is a
marital asset because it was created in part by the support of the
other spouse is now almost orthodox in divorce law.
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Law and Economics has also had profound effects on legal
education and scholarship. We have a better understanding of the
legal system as a result of economics than we used to have. It
used to be that the understanding of law was stuck at a most su-
perficial, rhetorical level so that, for example, because tort and
contract law use different vocabularies, they were thought to be-
long to different universes. Now we see with the help of economics
that torts and contracts are parallel, indeed interchangeable in
many respects, dealing with somewhat different activities but
using very similar analytic methods. Law becomes simpler when
it is viewed in terms of its implicit economic structure.
Economics has made interdisciplinary legal studies thor-
oughly respectable. There have always been extralegal perspec-
tives on law, but they didn't seem to offer too much to the practi-
cal lawyer. Now we can see that a lot of conventional legal think-
ing can be blown out of the water by the power of economic rea-
soning. Mert mentioned how the casual invocation of "fairness" as
an answer to difficult legal problems has become increasingly un-
tenable, even incredible, as a response to the challenges of eco-
nomics.
One of the most important things that economic analysis has
done for legal education is to stimulate an oppositional analysis.
One of the most fruitful consequences of a scholarly movement is,
like the grain of sand in the oyster, to stimulate something excit-
ing that may be entirely opposed to the irritant itself, in this case
economics. The critical legal studies movement is, in large part,
an angry response-but not a worthless response-to the eco-
nomic analysis of law. The emphasis that important legal scholars
like Professor Sunstein place on behavioral economics-on psy-
chological quirks that interfere with people's rational behavior-
is a development stimulated in significant part by the challenge
that economics has posed to traditional legal rules that are valued
by many people but that need new foundations.
Another thing that economics has done for law-and this
feeds directly into the question of the future of this movement-is
to create what sociologists of science call a "progressive" research
program as contrasted with a "degenerate" one in which people
have a good idea, the idea is absorbed, and the field, having suc-
ceeded in its aims, then goes out of business. There has been a
steady and substantial growth in the amount of economic scholar-
ship on law throughout the twenty-five years of its active period,
because young people coming into academic law-in an era when
there's much more pressure on academic lawyers to do research
and publish than used to be the case-see that the economic ap-
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proach provides almost infinite opportunities for interesting re-
search. And there doesn't seem to be any logical stopping point.
Every study in the economics of law suggests as many avenues for
new research as it closes off. Many of these studies reveal our ig-
norance of essential characteristics of the legal system and sug-
gest the next stage in research. The ability of this field to attract
brilliant young economists and law professors interested in eco-
nomics-often dual lawyer/economics Ph.D.s-is the most impor-
tant portent of a healthy field. These are the people whose fu-
ture-whose careers-depend on economic analysis of law having
a future. If they didn't think it had a future, they'd be paying a
very high price in making it their field of specialization.
The only reason the field may seem to have lost a little some-
thing in excitement is simply that, as a field grows, the work in it
necessarily becomes more specialized. It becomes increasingly dif-
ficult for someone to keep up with the entire literature of the field;
you have to specialize and if you specialize, your impact is going
to be limited. Your work may actually have more consequences in
the real world or for the future of social thought, but it's going to
be concentrated on a more limited subject matter than when the
field was entirely new.
Another thing, which is somewhat special to law, that sus-
tains the dynamism of Law and Economics is that even in periods
when economic theory may be stable, the law itself is in constant
flux. It is continuously throwing up new problems. Even if you're
operating with a stable body of theoretical and empirical tools,
you have opportunities to apply it to entirely new fields and
problems because of America's tremendous legal and policy dy-
namism.
One reason that the field holds such promise is that so much
remains to be done. Gary mentioned our difficulty in predicting
what laws will be passed, and Mert mentioned that it's a lot eas-
ier to explain how interest groups obtain regulation than to ex-
plain how the public interest obtains deregulation. Another di-
mension of our ignorance about the lawmaking process is that we
have great difficulty understanding judicial behavior. Judges do a
lot of the lawmaking in the United States, but it seems that they
have been constrained to act without reference to incentives, at
least the obvious incentives. Can their behavior be explained in
rational terms, and this explanation be used to explain the struc-
ture of the judge-made law? That is a big challenge for the eco-
nomic analysis of law.
We have had in the last thirty-five years an extraordinary
explosion of litigation in the United States. We find an inflection
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point around 1960, when what had been very slow growth for the
first two hundred years of colonial and then U.S. law suddenly
took off and has continued at extremely high levels. Not only is
there this very high rate of growth aggregated across all state and
federal courts, but also great variance in growth in different legal
systems and, as a result, great variance in the amount of litiga-
tion activity in different states and, even more so, in different
countries. We don't have many clues as to the causes of these im-
portant trends and variances in judicial behavior. But we are
coming into a period in which we have much better judicial statis-
tics, and legal statistics of all sorts, and much better ways of get-
ting access to the statistics and analyzing them. For the first time,
a great deal is known statistically about the incomes of lawyers
and law firms and changes in the sizes of law firms and the na-
ture of legal practice. Judicial statistics have become increasingly
abundant, comprehensive, and detailed. The empirical data for
analysis by economic scholars of law are growing more accessible
with the computer and the Internet, making it much easier to do
empirical research. Gary is right to express concern about the ex-
cessive ratio of theory to data analysis in the economic analysis of
law, but this will change as the analysis of data becomes simpler.
So I think the future of economic analysis of law is as prom-
ising as the past. The last twenty-five years have been very suc-
cessful. The next twenty-five years should be as successful. (ap-
plause).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Now that we are done with the first
part of the program, what I would like to do is to go back around
to the panel and to ask if they have any further comments on
what has been said. Now the little quotation that I read at the be-
ginning gave Law and Economics a certain intellectual or ideo-
logical cast in favor of small government, dispersement of power,
and so forth.
With the maturity and the increasing development of law,
does one want to lose that orientation? Does one, in fact, lose that
sort of mission? How might Law and Economics become more of
an analytical discipline, less of a political one, and is that a good
or a bad thing? Gary, do you want to start? Unfairly, of course.
GARY BECKER: Well, let me start with the question you
raised. George Stigler wrote a very interesting paper on why the
study of economics tends to make people politically conservative.
Not inevitably conservative, of course; there have been some great
economists and are some great economists who would not, by any
stretch of the use of the word "conservative," be called conserva-
tive.
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But on the whole, it's true that economists are generally more
conservative than others and the reasons are very simple. The
appreciation of how markets function and how individuals choose
gives one an orientation toward the belief that a decentralized
system is typically going to operate better than a centralized sys-
tem, whether coming from the government or from some other
source. So this association of Law and Economics with "conserva-
tive" or smaller government is not a happenstance of the particu-
lar economists who have been attracted to Law and Economics,
but it is an implication of bringing economics into any discipline.
And I don't think that's going to disappear, although there
will be a considerable diversity of opinion among economists and
among Law and Economics people. So that would be my comment
on that one.
Let me make only a couple brief comments. I've listened to
the various erudite comments by my other panelists. I've learned
considerably from them. On the whole, I would generally agree
with their emphasis.
I do agree with Ronald that clearly the study of the impact of
the law on the economy is extremely important. We don't know
nearly as much as we would like to know about the impact and
there is exciting work going on, and maybe in two hundred
years-you say a hundred-we'll have a better understanding of
the law's effect on the economy. Of course, the converse is also
true.
The impact of the economy-I don't mean economics--on the
evolution of law is extremely important and we probably know
even less about that direction. So, I agree with Ronald, that this
question is part of a broad area that we are still learning about
and in which there's good research going on.
But I don't think there are any enormous breakthroughs at
the moment going on in these areas. Of course, it's always hard to
predict what a breakthrough will be, what a great idea will be,
and to ask any of us to predict what are going to be the great in-
novations in Law and Economics is a question that I always ref-
use to answer. If I knew them, I would be doing them now.
(laughter).
These breakthroughs are unpredictable and a younger or
older person will come along with a great idea, and they'll have an
impact. None of the things that the various panelists contributed
would have been predictable prior to their introduction. And so I
don't think we can predict the breakthroughs.
What we can say is that there have been enormous successes
of the Law and Economics movement of various kinds. As I have
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emphasized, however, part of the success has to do with the fact
that the movement came up against relatively little opposition in
terms of systematic theory. That's not a criticism of economics. It's
a criticism of what was there before.
There are many gaps remaining-enormous gaps-in things
we don't know. This is a great opportunity for new people coming
into the field for this opportunity to be realized. I believe-and
there I may differ with my good friend, Dick, and others-for
these opportunities to be realized, it will take more than just peo-
ple coming along and doing further applications. It will take-
maybe in response to these applications-somebody coming along
and showing comparable insights to what Dick and Ronald and
Mert and others have made.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: All right. Ronald, I have a question for
you. Is that all right? Along this same line, you wrote about the
Federal Communications Commission in 1959,14 and talked about
the importance of markets and well defined property rights in the
broadcast spectrum. To some extent, your arguments have now
influenced actual policymaking. But why, if Law and Economics is
such a powerful discipline, does it turn out that its influence is so
delayed and so halting?
RONALD COASE: I've never thought that the influence
would come quickly. I don't regard, at my age, a hundred years as
a particularly long period of time. (laughter).
If one talks about the particular example that you gave-ini-
tially put forward, I might say, in The University of Chicago Law
Review by Leo Herzel 5 and remarked on by me in 1959-the idea
that the use of the radio frequency spectrum should be priced has
been adopted, but why was it adopted? Not for the reasons that I
put forward, but because selling off the frequencies would raise
some money for the government at a time when it was anxious to
reduce the deficit. (laughter). But I think that's often the case. I
don't think one should mind that people adopt one's ideas for rea-
sons which don't commend themselves to oneself. That's the usual
way that things happen. (laughter).
When I was in the civil service-and I was a civil servant for
a period-my boss never agreed with my ideas, but I always put
them forward to him because I thought, "Some day or other he'll
be in a committee and people will say, 'What should we do about
14 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
Leo Herzel, Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regula-
tion, 18 U Chi L Rev 802 (1951).
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this?' and he won't know but he'll feel obliged to say something
(laughter), so he'd remember what I had told him." (laughter).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: And we wonder why influence is so
difficult to trace. (laughter). Isn't the same thing true in securi-
ties, Merton?
MERTON MILLER: The influence?
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Yes.
MERTON MILLER: I don't know. I was going to comment
further in a somewhat different way on the problem of efficiency
that we started to talk about earlier. But let me say first, I never
got to the second question on your list which was of some par-
ticular interest to our law school students. What is the most
promising work still to be done in Law and Economics and how
should you do it? What is the role of mathematical modeling ver-
sus empirical research? We worry about these things in finance
too and my personal feeling is to go easy on the mathematical
stuff. We have had much more experience with mathematics than
you have and, from our point of view, mathematical modeling
generally has been found very useful for checking the rigor of your
ideas and for looking for holes in the argument. But I don't think I
could find many cases where the mathematical modeling actually
led to new truths. I think you get the new truth and then you
show that it is indeed rigorous and consistent.
But let me go back to this point about efficiency because I
think it has a big impact on the securities area. There is the feel-
ing-and I've seen it in the Law and Economics literature-that
somehow there is efficiency in the law, that we're moving inexo-
rably to eliminate waste and inefficiencies, in that we're using an
analogy based on the price system and the behavior of competitive
markets. I wonder, however, how strong those efficiency argu-
ments really are, whether they're more than just interesting
analogies.
The economic relations we talk about can be expressed in the
form, y = a + bx + s. The "bx" part represents the systematic part
we've explained; and the epsilon represents the unsystematic part
that we haven't succeeded in explaining. We calibrate the impor-
tance of the systematic part by calculating a number known as R 2
lying between zero (no explanatory power) and unity (complete
explanation). When it comes to the "efficiency" of the law, that is
the extent to which what we see has a systematic explanation, I
wonder what the R2 really is. If you're going to keep using the
concept of legal efficiency, you'd better start providing some
measurement. That should be a major point in the research
agenda of the field of Law and Economics.
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RICHARD EPSTEIN: Now that leads me to my last question
before we throw it open. This question deals with the efficiency of
the common law. In the same period that we've seen the rise of
Law and Economics, we've seen some clear overlap between tort
and contract. But if you go back to decisions starting in the early
60s, the dominant trend has been to exclude the use of private
contracts to allocate the provision of medical services, residential
leases, and all sorts of finished products. So the question to Dick
is, if the common law is so efficient, do we really have powerful
justifications for these restrictions on contractual freedom or did
the efficiency of the law end just at the time that the mastery of
Law and Economics began? (laughter).
RICHARD POSNER: Yes, well, that would be a nice irony,
but it's difficult to discuss such specific...
GARY BECKER: Well, let me just add something so that
Dick can answer my question as well. To come back to Mert's
question, I don't believe that we have moved very strongly in
making laws more efficient if we interpret "law" more generally to
include regulation. The example I would take is an area that
Richard Epstein has worked on a lot: the labor field. We've had
enormous growth in legislation in that area, not only in the
United States but throughout Europe as well.
It's hard to interpret any of that legislation as adding to effi-
ciency. Dick gave examples earlier where there clearly has been a
greater appreciation of economic principles-antitrust and a
number of these other areas truly reflect economic thinking-but
it's a very mixed picture. In some areas we move toward efficiency
and in some areas we move very strongly in the opposite direc-
tion. I'm not talking about minor changes. I think what's hap-
pened in the labor field has been extremely important. Maybe it's
worth having, but it certainly cannot be justified on efficiency
grounds.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Now we leave it to the judge.
RICHARD POSNER: Actually, I think the effect of a lot of
the new legislation dealing with employment is exaggerated. I
think the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, for example,
while creating some opportunities for lawyers (laughter), has had
little or no effect on the age composition of the work force. I can't
go into detail; but employers, with relatively simple mechanisms
like the early retirement buyout, not only get around the object of
the law, but make the employees themselves pay for the admini-
stration of the law.
GARY BECKER: Yes, but I don't know of any good study
that has estimated the cost of this law. Take universities and re-
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tirement policy. It's not obvious that the fact that we no longer
can force people to retire has been a trivial cost to universities.
Any program that we introduce has to be completely general and
cannot be tailored to individuals. Now maybe it hasn't had a big
effect, but I think it's an area...
RICHARD POSNER: The university did not believe that this
law was going to go into effect. As a result, it did nothing to pre-
pare for it. Firms in the age discrimination era implicitly say to
their employees that, as a result of the law, your employment
package now includes another fringe benefit. You can stay on and
work beyond the ordinary retirement age. Well, you're going to
have to pay for that.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Yes, but what about the transition ef-
fect?
RICHARD POSNER: In the case of universities, they were
given a number of years of warning and they believed that they
were going to get this law repealed.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: In any event, please go back to the
first part of the question.
RICHARD POSNER: There's certainly a lot of inefficient
legislation. I think that common law rulemaking tends to be more
efficient. To some extent, it's true, the judges were caught up in
the collectivist mood of the 60s and 70s; but if you look at those
patterns carefully, they tend to be concentrated in particular
states and often are reversed eventually. I don't think the aggre-
gate impact has been that bad.
But what surprises me about what you said, Gary, is that, if
we compare the extraordinary deregulation of important parts of
the American economy, such as financial services and telecom-
munications, and the near collapse of the labor movement, we
find that the effect of these developments has been to make this a
freer country than it was in the 60s. These labor laws are in the
category of annoyances. (laughter). They are irritants that good
lawyers reduce to where there is only a very minor impact.
GARY BECKER: I'd like to see that demonstrated. I believe
the picture is very mixed. There have been areas where we've had
enormous deregulation and improved telecommunications, finan-
cial markets, and transportation. Those have been very impor-
tant. On the other hand, we've had more important and large ar-
eas where regulations have increased enormously, not only in la-
bor, but environmental fields, and I don't know of anybody who
has demonstrated that these increased regulations have had a
minor impact. Maybe that's true; I don't know anybody who's
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demonstrated it. I doubt if it's true. If you look at the total amount
of regulation on the federal register, that's grown greatly.
RICHARD POSNER: Environmental regulation has benefits.
Minimum wage regulation and age discrimination regulation
have no benefits. (laughter). So the question is: Are the costs large
or small? And I think the costs of those laws are small.
GARY BECKER: Maybe, but the total amount of regulation
has certainly increased. It hasn't declined, despite the deregula-
tory movements we've had.
RICHARD POSNER: If you look at the way people are
working in this country-how hard they're working, how much
turnover there is in the labor force, how free employers feel in
shifting their businesses all over the world and extracting conces-
sions from their employees, it doesn't seem to me that American
employers are operating in a labor market in which the law is
making it difficult for them to operate efficiently.
GARY BECKER: That may be true, but what evidence do
you have?
RICHARD POSNER: There have been studies of the impact
of the age discrimination law on the age profile of employees, 6
and it seems that businesses have been given enough flexibility
by the law to avoid the most serious inefficiencies. The impact of
the age discrimination law on the average college and university
has been very slight, and the retirement age unaffected. Wiscon-
sin, for example, had an age discrimination law before the federal
law and the number of people staying on to teach at the Wiscon-
sin universities after normal retirement age was minuscule. Elite
universities may be different. Because the work is so light in the
elite universities (laughter), people can continue "working" in-
definitely (applause). But the workers who have physically and
mentally demanding jobs (laughter) get tired and they want to re-
tire. They do not want to work into their seventies.
GARY BECKER: The average unemployment in Europe is
11.5 percent. It cannot be explained by any cyclical factors. It has
to be related to regulation and taxes. Taking a little broader world
perspective on what's been going on in the labor markets, to claim
that these regulations have had trivial effects flies in the face of
what we know has been happening in country after country.
RICHARD POSNER: That's an extraordinary example. We
have 5 percent unemployment.
GARY BECKER: I know.
"6 Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age ch 13 (Chicago 1995).
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RICHARD POSNER: So you're not going to blame, you're not
going to use the European regulation to...
GARY BECKER: rm talking about in general the impact of
regulation. I'm trying to get a more worldwide perspective.
RONALD COASE: Yes, I'd like to join in. (laughter and ap-
plause).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Go ahead.
RONALD COASE: Law and Economics isn't an American
subject. It's a subject for all countries, and I think it's a mistake
which is often made here, I might say, to discuss problems solely
in terms of what happens in the United States. I think what's
happening in Europe is very worrisome at the present time and
may have very unfortunate effects.
RICHARD POSNER: But it's worrying for completely differ-
ent reasons, because they don't have strong antidiscrimination
laws in Europe.
RONALD COASE: I didn't mean this particular thing about
which you continue to argue. (laughter).
RICHARD POSNER: There are laws about the employment
relation in Europe that we do not have. We have a different set of
laws which apparently have no effect.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: No effect seems to be...
RICHARD POSNER: Okay, a slight effect. (laughter).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: The decline in levels of permanent
employment traces its roots to an employment relationship that is
more heavily taxed and regulated than independent contractors,
so it's not at all clear that the rise of temps is a preferred market
response or whether it's an effort to evade regulation which
minimizes part, but not all, of the damages. The stagnation in
American wage levels is also consistent with a very different pro-
file. We grew much more rapidly...
RICHARD POSNER: That bothers you? Stagnation in
wages?
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Sure, it does. I hope it bothers me.
Yes, it does bother me. But I'm only a moderator. Now, I mean...
(laughter).
GARY BECKER: It bothers me too.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Well, thank you, we've been stung to
the quick. In any respect, once we start to talk about Medicare
and Social Security and indeed the entire worldwide question of
what we do with guaranteed state provision of pensions and
health benefits, I do think we get a somewhat somber picture. But
now, let us open this up to the audience. Anyone who is intrepid
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and foolish enough to ask a question (laughter) will be summarily
dispatched with a very clever answer. (laughter).
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We have more litigation than we
ever have had. Aren't those transaction costs? Is there something
going on here? If the common law is so efficient, shouldn't the
people who craft the law make it pure enough that people won't
litigate? What's the problem? Are the judges arguing with the
legislature to the point that none of us can predict what's going to
happen to anything?
MERTON MILLER: I just want to make a personal note:
that's why I'm not a lawyer. (laughter). My father was a lawyer
and I was filled, as a young boy, with thoughts of Clarence Dar-
row and so on. And he would come home and I'd say, "How'd it go
today, Dad?" He'd say, 'Terrible. I think this one may have to go
to court." (laughter).
I don't know why there is this huge increase in litigation.
Maybe transaction costs have become lower in the sense that it
costs less to bring a suit now. So you're going to get more of them.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: That presupposes the stakes are con-
stant, but if the stakes quadruple by regulation, it may well be
that the litigation costs are higher but they just haven't kept pace
with the amount that's in the pot. And that's my theory about the
situation. With the decline of property rights, it turns out that
there are more contingent and fewer fixed claims on resources.
That constellation of forces generates the results that our audi-
ence member has described. Next question. (laughter). Other
comments on that, Gary?
GARY BECKER: No, I don't have anything. Your answer, I
thought, was very good.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Oh, Ill take it. (laughter). It's high
praise for me. Are there any other questions about this? We don't
have to keep this thing going. You do not need to stay here until
six o'clock. This is an option right rather than an obligation, but
nonetheless, an audience so large should have somebody intrepid.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was wondering, in the 1930s or
20s, you have economists like Walton Hamilton, Thurman Arnold
and so on, working on questions of economics of law. And I was
wondering whether the decline of Law and Economics reflected
the decline of institutional economics.
RICHARD POSNER: I think it's possible that there was a
little trough. If you go back to the late 20s and early 30s, you find
economic work on bankruptcies by the likes of William Douglas,
which became unfashionable and disappeared, and it's only dec-
ades later that you have modern economic theory being applied to
1156 [64:1129
1997] Looking Forward 1157
these issues. But yes, there was that brief efflorescence of institu-
tional economics, with some legal applications. A very good
economist at Columbia, Robert Hale, in the 20s and 30s antici-
pated a certain amount of the modern economic analysis of law;
but his work didn't fit the Zeitgeist, so it was ignored for decades.
MERTON MILLER: I want to add one little note. I wasn't
aware that Thurman Arnold was an economist. I thought he was
a lawyer and that was, of course, part of the problem. (laughter).
He played such an active role in antitrust and he really didn't ap-
proach it from an economist's perspective.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: He was the source and the inspiration
for the view that virtually every corporate transaction was a vio-
lation of the antitrust law. This is not a summary of his point of
view, but he was certainly very much in the "bigness is badness"
camp, rather than looking at market structures and consumer al-
ternatives.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I know Professor Becker has done
some work in the area of preference formation, and I was curious
if perhaps Professor Becker and maybe the others could comment
on what they see as the areas of the law where the new scholar-
ship on preference formation might matter.
GARY BECKER: Well, it's a good question. It's an important
question. There has been, as you indicated, exciting work by a
growing number of people on trying to understand how people's
preferences get formed and get changed over their lifetime. It's an
area I've worked on, Cass Sunstein here has worked on it, and a
number of other people here and elsewhere have worked on that
question.
I believe preference formation has significant potential in
general in economics. It was not particularly stimulated by law
nor is its application particularly oriented toward law. It came out
of two different motivations: first, some unhappiness with ex-
perimental work testing the assumptions made about preferences;
and, second, general suspicion of the economist's typical assump-
tion that people have preferences that wouldn't alter, that some-
how never change, that people couldn't change by choice or by ad-
aptation. Those assumptions weren't accurate or adequate and
left a lot of problems.
Where does it come into law? Laws affect people's prefer-
ences. Not necessarily initially, but over time they do. Take for
example, desegregation of our schools. Having to go to school with
and ride with and interact with African-Americans had a signifi-
cant impact on the attitudes that younger whites in the South felt
in these interactions. I think laws can affect people's preferences
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by changing the environment in which they are operating. This
has not yet been integrated into Law and Economics but, let me
add, it's not yet been integrated in economics more generally.
These are new areas of development. They are extremely prom-
ising areas. We don't know yet exactly in what direction this is
going to take us, but I personally have committed some of my own
research to that area because it's been a neglected area. It's some-
thing economic analysis, along with other concepts, can say some-
thing about and, in particular, it will arguably have important
relevance for understanding the interaction between law and be-
havior, and it goes both ways.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Do you have something to add?
RICHARD POSNER: I think this is actually one of the new
areas in the economic analysis of law: looking at the effect of sub-
stitutes for law as a method of social control. Bob Ellickson wrote
an important book on that question' and Professor Sunstein's
work has deservedly gotten attention.'8
An interesting example of the interaction of law and decen-
tralized, unofficial, extralegal methods of regulating people's be-
havior has to do with the law of privacy. Privacy is inimical to
regulation by norms because the enforcement of norms depends
on private people observing deviations from the normatively pre-
scribed conduct. The more the law tries to protect people's pri-
vacy, the more it undermines non-legal social control through
norms. So there are many rich interactions between the law and
social norms. Richard, could I just say a word...
RICHARD EPSTEIN: I wouldn't dare stop you. (laughter).
RICHARD POSNER: About stagnant wages.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Yes.
RICHARD POSNER: Because I think it's...
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Only ifI can say a word about...
RICHARD POSNER: It is a particularly good example of the
point that both Ronald and Gary made, that we really don't know
a lot about the effect of laws. We do not know whether the anti-
discrimination laws do have significant effects or don't have sig-
nificant effects. One reason we don't know is that we really don't
know whether wages have been stagnant in the United States,
because we now understand that the inflation rate has been sys-
tematically exaggerated and, even if the exaggeration is small,
the effect on the rate of growth of real wages could be large.
"Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard
1991).
1 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev 903 (1996).
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Moreover, the "stagnant" wage figures tend to be based on weekly
wages rather than hourly wages. And even if wages really are
stagnant, the standard of living is improving tremendously as a
result of product improvements; and the term "stagnant" wages is
sometimes used simply to describe, in a dramatic way, the appar-
ent increase in the inequality with which income is distributed-
and no one knows whether that's a bad or good thing. So it seems
to me that getting the wage profile right and then relating it to
the new laws regulating the employment relation would be a
great research topic.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: You go first.
GARY BECKER: Let me just comment a little on that. I
agree we don't know with certainty the impact of regulation on
the wage movement. Maybe it's been trivial. I do think there is
considerable evidence that wages have been growing much more
slowly than they were in the 60s and the 70s, and the confirming
evidence is the productivity estimates. The wage growth is consis-
tent with the productivity estimates that we have, although these
estimates themselves have problems associated with them. But
the link between stagnant wages and regulation is uncertain. No-
body knows. I think the slow wage growth is mainly due to the
fact that we've had slowdowns in productivity. Part of that may
have been due to regulation, maybe a trivial part, maybe a large
part. It's one of these great research topics with which quite a few
people have been struggling. Nobody's yet come up with a good
way of cutting into that problem and therefore, if you had to get
an honest answer about why productivity has slowed down in the
United States or has appeared to slow down in the United States,
the honest answer of an economist should be, "We really don't
know." It may be regulation. I doubt if that's the major factor, but
it could be a significant factor.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: But it is striking that the cusp point
lies between 1970 and 1973-the time at which one starts to ob-
serve the most vigorous form of labor market regulation. And on
the inflation point, the one answer that one might give is, yes, it
may be wrong today and understate the true levels of productivity
increases. But it's not at all clear that the same biases did not ex-
ist in the index in the earlier period.
GARY BECKER: Weaker then because services were
smaller.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Maybe, but you're talking about dif-
ferences of I to 3 percent and so even if you add back the produc-
tivity gains in both periods, you still have a 40 percent differential
which has to be explained. And when you talk about labor market
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regulation, it's not just the antidiscrimination laws. It is certainly
the tax on labor: Social Security, Medicare taxes, similar taxes,
OSHA regulations, and so forth. It's been a very large cumulative
impact and some of us, at least myself, find it very worrisome.
But now, I return to my moderator's role. We are coming to
the end. There is time for one more question from the audience,
and then what rd like to do is to give every one of the panelists a
minute or so to sum up, in any wry or profound way, and then I
will call the festivities to an end after taking, of course, the last
word. (laughter). Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Would the panelists comment on the
Law and Economics of taxes?
RICHARD EPSTEIN: I'm always happy. (laughter). Does
anyone want to try it or should I do that since it's an area that
I've done work in. Mert?
MERTON MILLER: Well, it's an enormous part of finance.
It's hard to separate out the tax effects from the non-tax effects.
You do it as a matter of analytics. Let us imagine first the world
with no taxes-I love to imagine those worlds. (laughter). That
gets you started, but then you have to put the taxes in. So much
transaction activity in the real world is driven by taxes that it's
become an important part of study of the field of finance. I'm de-
lighted to hear mentioned my intellectual mentor, Henry Simons,
who was a tax man when I knew him and not a Law and Eco-
nomics man. But he was the one who started the modern analysis
of taxation and I hope we're carrying on his tradition.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: The basic principles that he an-
nounced were essentially a comprehensive income base, low levels
of taxation, and a minimum of special taxes unless they could be
justified by some specialized cost imposed like pollution and so
forth. The Internal Revenue Code has been schizophrenic; the
rate of modification is much more rapid than it used to be, which
means that long-term transactional certainty is much more diffi-
cult to achieve.
It also turns out that the number of specialized provisions
has increased, which means that the ability to categorize and to
alter transactions for tax reasons relative to their economic merits
has increased. Consequently, the costs of compliance have gone
radically upward and the invasions of privacy have increased. It's
another triumph for the efficiency of the Law and Economics
movement as applied to public policy research, cynically stated.
Dick, do you have something to say?
RICHARD POSNER: One point related to taxes. A newspa-
per published an article recently about income tax enforcement
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that was a perfect illustration of Gary Becker's work on the eco-
nomics of crime and punishment. It pointed out that because
Congress has been ungenerous with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice, the audit rate has declined. The Service has responded by re-
ferring more and more cases for criminal prosecution-and they're
explicit about this strategy. They say, "Since we're not catching as
many tax evaders, when we do catch them, we are going to press
for heavy criminal punishments."
RICHARD EPSTEIN: But it's also clear by the one striking
set of figures that the amount of non-cash, non-taxable income in
the United States is exceedingly large, often in very low income
groups. In addition, that percentage seems to be increasing, which
means, of course, that the temptation to evade the law, in order to
be at parity with your honorable citizens who have already de-
cided to avoid it, creates a much more difficult political morality
on compliance. We do have major problems there, but with all
that said, we should go back around the panel again for one or
two minutes of summation so that we can be out of here by six
o'clock, because we do not believe in temporal trespassing in this
exalted hall. (laughter).
GARY BECKER: It's really wonderful to be part of a celebra-
tion of a field that's had such great successes. It doesn't happen
very often. As an economist, seeing the unanticipated success of
economic reasoning since I became a graduate student is a won-
derful feeling.
Let me say, as a graduate student, I had the opportunity to
attend one of the pioneer courses in Law and Economics, a joint
course by Aaron Director and Edward Levi, which was a wonder-
ful course and, unfortunately, only a few economics students then
had the sense to go over and listen to both of them discuss the in-
teraction of Law and Economics. So this has been a field that's
had enormous successes. And nothing I said was designed to con-
tradict that notion. I believe it's one of the great success stories in
social sciences in the last thirty years.
Nevertheless, after hearing my learned colleagues, I still be-
lieve that the field is currently stagnating-not declining, because
it's growing and there are more people coming into it. Im meas-
uring it not by numbers but by intellectual creativity, intellectual
excitement, and in this respect, I think it's stagnant. That might
be temporary. All fields go through this cycle. I've worked a lot in
labor economics, and labor economics is also in a stagnant period
at present. Many fields go through that cycle, so it's not unusual.
In fact, it's usual.
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Then it takes somebody coming along, maybe stimulated by
some real world observations or in some other way, who gets a
new insight and doesn't overthrow what went before, but adds on
to what went before, and we get another burst of activity. I think
that's how science progresses and it certainly has progressed that
way in economics.
I am less optimistic than my learned judge on the panel
about the positive impact of this movement on public policy. Yes,
we can point to great examples of successes-telecommunications,
financial services, et cetera-those are great successes and
economists, along with lawyers, played an important part in those
successes. But there are also many other examples of enormous
importance not only in the United States. I'm taking, as Ronald
did, a broader perspective. I don't think we should limit our con-
cern to the United States, Europe, or other parts of the world.
There are major areas where policy is moving exactly in the oppo-
site direction to that proposed by Law and Economics.
Look at total regulations. Even in the United States, they've
grown enormously over a period where we have been fortunate to
have a deregulation movement. Under both Republican and
Democratic administrations, regulation has skyrocketed.
So, I think Law and Economics is a great field. It's had a
large impact. No doubt it's had impact in practical ways, in anti-
trust and so on.
Coming back to a theme I mentioned earlier, what depresses
me is that Law and Economics doesn't seem to have had an im-
pact in understanding the laws and regulations that we see
emerging. We know there are special interests and general inter-
ests that often have another agenda but I don't think it's an accu-
rate reading of the successes of Law and Economics, as numerous
as they are, to conclude that somehow legislation and regulation
overall have become more efficient.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Ronald?
RONALD COASE: We've talked about growth and efficiency
through a change in the law or for some other reason. I think that
one has to realize that the extra value that comes from greater ef-
ficiency always goes to someone and that someone always has an
incentive to make the change, to bring it about, and that someone
sometimes has political power and sometimes does not. When the
opportunity occurs, the change will happen.
Now, one example of a move to efficiency is the creation of
markets. There are lots of people who have an interest in the
creation of markets. For example, I've had an interest-a little
concern even-with the rights to pollute which have been traded
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on the Chicago Board of Trade. Now, this market came about-
and probably wouldn't have come about-without the fact that
there were traders who were going to make money out of the
institution of a market. So we mustn't assume that there are no
incentives to create markets.
I would like to emphasize one other point that I made,
namely that the subject of Law and Economics is not an American
subject. It is concerned with what's happening in all countries of
the world and I think one can at least give an optimistic example
of a change in law which led to things being dramatically better,
and that's the introduction of household responsibility contracts
in China where agricultural output increased, people say doubled.
I don't know whether it's doubled or not, but it certainly increased
dramatically so that the lives of the peasants are much better
than they were. I think if we take an international perspective,
the subject will become richer and also America won't fall behind
in the development of the subject.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Mert?
MERTON MILLER: I guess I want to end on a note of "little"
think, rather than "big" think by making a point or two about the
technology of doing Law and Economics.
My former students here from the Law School are always
asking, "What should somebody who's interested in Law and Eco-
nomics study?" Well, one thing you'd better study is modern fi-
nance because finance provides much of the technology that's
used in the Law and Economics field.
You must know, for example, about event studies and how to
use them. Event studies were invented over at the business school
in the early 70s and they've spread all the way through the law
now and they are an indispensable tool for measuring the effects
of changes in laws and regulations. You must also know modern
portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing model, and the nature of
risk. Risk, alas, is not a simple, intuitive concept.
You also have to know the efficient market principle, what it
means, what its limitations are. That's something that's spread-
ing through the law, but it has to be studied. You should know, if
I may say so, the M&M theorems which come into the law in a va-
riety of ways and are taught in every course in corporate finance.
Why don't more of you law school students come on over and take
some courses in finance at the business school? We have the tech-
nology that we can put at your disposal. (laughter).
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Dick, are you going to invite people to
court? (laughter).
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RICHARD POSNER: Il offer a footnote to Mert's point. This
happened to come up in a workshop yesterday. If two businesses
merge and you want to figure out whether it is an anticompetitive
merger, you might think, well, look at the stock prices of the firms
that are merging. But that wouldn't tell you anything, because
stock prices might go up because the firms could collude better
with the other firms in the market or because the merged firm
was going to be more efficient.
But suppose you looked at the prices of the stock of the other
firms in the market. Presumably, if the merged firms are going to
collude and hold a price umbrella over the other firms, the other
firms' stock prices will rise. If their stock prices fall, the implica-
tion is that the merged firm is going to lower prices. So, as Mert
says, there are many highly practical everyday applications in fi-
nance theory and other parts of economics to law.
The other point I want to comment on is the very interesting,
probably insoluble, question of influence. Ronald mentioned the
FCC's airwaves auction, and points out correctly that the strong
motive for it was deficit reduction. But ask yourself, why is it that
they decided to sell some airwaves rather than some national
parks? We could have gotten $20 billion for Yosemite alone.
(laughter). A different question is, why wasn't it until the 1980s
that governments, which are always greedy for money, discovered
this revenue source? I think the answer is that, while the impulse
for profound policy changes comes from social forces rather than
universities, the universities can legitimize measures the impulse
for which is not itself efficiency-oriented and can show distinc-
tions between various ways of achieving the end of collecting
revenue. In that way, Law and Economics can have an indirect
but cumulatively profound influence on policy.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Well, I think we've come just about to
the end of our appointed hour. But what I'd like to say is, it seems
to be quite clear that we're fighting this battle, intellectual and
otherwise, in multiple fora. It seems to me that the level of so-
phistication that we are capable of bringing to problems of public
affairs is greater now than it ever has been before because of the
accumulated learning of the last fifty years. But the mission of
translation perhaps is more uncertain now than it's ever been be-
fore, not only here in Chicago but throughout the United States
and the rest of the world.
And certainly, if I were younger than I am today-and I
guess I'm the youngest person up here-I would think that all of
these challenges mean that, whatever we say about the future,
the bumps and turns and the excitement that exists today will
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certainly transmit itself, not only in the grand theories and lofty
disputes of our times, but also in the tough, nitty-gritty questions
which arise whenever we talk about the interaction of theory and
practice. That's what this university has been devoted to. That's
what this law school has been devoted to. That's what this panel
has fought about. And so what I think we ought to do is to give
our panelists a fine hand to thank them for all that they've done
to keep us spirited and combative for the rest of the year. Thank
you. (applause).
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